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‘Global	Britain’?	Assessing	Boris	Johnson’s	major
changes	to	national	security	and	foreign	policy
There	is	a	real	risk	that	the	shake-up	of	UK	national	security	and	foreign	policy	currently	being	orchestrated	by
Number	10	will	not	provide	the	solutions	the	country	needs,	write	Edward	Elliott	and	Sam	Goodman.	Here	they
interview	former	National	Security	Advisers,	former	Foreign	Secretaries,	former	foreign	policy	advisers	to	PMs,	and
former	senior	diplomats,	to	assess	recent	developments	and	their	potential	repercussions.
The	first	year	of	Boris	Johnson’s	premiership	has	been	dominated	by	Brexit	and	then	COVID-19.	This	chaotic
schedule	has	not	held	him	back	though	from	making	a	big	shake-up	of	UK	national	security	and	foreign	policy.	But
is	it	the	right	shake-up?	Many	policy	experts	have	long	argued	that	the	UK	has	been	in	need	of	greater	co-
ordination	in	how	it	approaches	national	security	and	foreign	policy;	and	under	the	auspices	of	the	Sedwill	driven
‘Fusion	Doctrine’,	an	attempt	to	fuse	capabilities	to	deliver	‘strategy-led	design	of	(national	security)	policy’,	the
Conservative	Government	has	been	moving	around	the	pieces	of	the	UK’s	national	security	infrastructure	over	the
last	few	years.
The	Prime	Minister	has	ramped	up	this	process	in	recent	weeks,	He	replaced	Sir	Mark	Sedwill	as	National	Security
Adviser	(NSA)	with	political	appointee	David	Frost,	merged	the	Department	for	International	Development	(DfID)
into	the	Foreign	and	Commonwealth	Office	(FCO),	and	encouraged	Sir	Simon	McDonald	to	step	down	early	as
Permanent	Under-Secretary	at	the	FCO.	Through	these	changes,	and	the	upcoming	Integrated	Review,	there	is	a
risk	that	this	government	could	end	up	centralising	foreign	policy	once	again	to	the	confines	of	a	small	cadre	of
unaccountable	advisers	loyal	to	the	Prime	Minister.
National	Security	Council	(NSC)
The	NSC	is	supposedly	central	to	all	national	security	decisionmaking	yet	has	been	neglected	by	Johnson.	In	many
ways,	the	NSC	is	the	perfect	showcase	of	the	changes	the	PM	is	looking	to	make	–	and	of	the	risks	that	come	with
it.	The	decisionmaking	process	at	the	top	level	of	foreign	policy	is	always	going	to	be	somewhat	nebulous,	and	it	is
hard	to	know	exactly	what	happens	behind	closed	doors.
In	late	May,	it	was	revealed	that	the	NSC	had	not	met	in	months,	with	the	official	excuse	being	the	pandemic.
Although	former	NSAs	we	spoke	to	confirmed	it	had	started	meeting	again	since	the	end	of	lockdown,	the	ease	with
which	the	NSC	has	been	put	to	one	side	during	a	national	crisis	is	worrying.	To	provide	just	one	example,	one
source	told	us	the	NSC	had	only	met	once	in	the	past	few	months	on	Huawei,	a	critical	national	security	issue	that
has	yet	to	be	fully	addressed	and	resolved.
Now	more	than	ever,	the	future	of	the	NSC	is	up	in	the	air.
Decline	of	the	NSC	over	the	years
The	UK’s	NSC	structure	was	the	brainchild	of	the	Coalition	Government	and	was	considered	a	break	from	past
allegations	of	foreign	policy	being	run	by	a	small	clique	of	advisers	and	Ministers	in	an	informal	setting.	Under	the
Coalition,	the	NSC	stood	separate	from	No.10	with	its	own	secretariat	under	a	permanent	secretary-level	National
Security	Adviser.	Members	of	the	NSC	have	generally	included	relevant	government	ministers,	the	heads	of	the
security	and	intelligence	agencies,	and	the	Chief	of	the	Defence	Staff.
According	to	Lord	Peter	Ricketts	–	NSA	under	Cameron	–	the	NSC	would	meet	every	week	after	Cabinet;	key
ministers	would	be	expected	to	attend	or	decisions	would	be	made	affecting	their	Department	in	their	absence.
Other	sources	confirmed	that	it	met	weekly	under	Theresa	May	too.	However,	there	were	instances	where
meetings	would	be	postponed,	with	former	members	of	the	NSC	stating	that	over	the	past	ten	years,	it	would	be
reasonable	to	estimate	that	it	met	on	average	30-35	times	a	year.
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Much	of	the	initial	decline	of	the	prominence	of	the	NSC	happened	under		May.	Arguably	the	biggest	structural	shift
was	combining	the	role	of	the	NSA	with	that	of	the	Cabinet	Secretary.	By	merging	those	two	roles,	May	was
inevitably	diluting	the	impact	of	the	NSA,	who	had	less	time	to	dedicate	to	the	role.	Sedwill’s	predecessor	as	NSA
between	2015-2017,	Sir	Mark	Lyall	Grant,	told	us	that	the	merging	of	the	two	roles	‘was	a	mistake’,	although	one
brought	about	by	the	circumstances	at	the	time..’	This	sentiment	has	been	shared	by	many,	including	former	NSA
Lord	Ricketts	and	Tobias	Ellwood	MP,	Chair	of	the	Defence	Select	Committee.
When	quizzed	by	the	Joint	Committee	on	the	National	Security	Strategy	in	2019,	Mark	Sedwill	admitted	doing	the
job	‘somewhat	differently’	from	his	predecessors,	focusing	on	‘embedding	the	Fusion	Doctrine’	and	‘reforming
Whitehall’.	The	question	then	becomes	who	takes	the	decisions	the	NSA	used	to	take?	Sir	David	Manning,	former
UK	Ambassador	to	Israel	and	the	US,	and	former	foreign	policy	adviser	to	Tony	Blair,	has	stated	that	the	NSC’s
focus	and	effectiveness,	unlike	the	US	NSC,	seemed	to	depend	strongly	on	the	personality,	interests,	and	time	of
the	Prime	Minister	of	the	day.	‘He	or	she	chairs	the	meetings	as	they	are	the	ones	who	chair	the	meetings	and,	it
would	appear,	decides	what	priority	to	give	to	NSC	business’.	This	assertion	is	backed	up	by	Ricketts,	who
recognises	that	the	NSC’s	effectiveness	depends	on	the	Prime	Minister’s	use	of	it.
Gavin	Williamson’s	supposed	leaks	from	the	NSC	in	2019	further	undermined	the	NSC,	risking	making	senior	civil
servants	and	intelligence	officials	less	willing	to	‘speak	freely	about	sensitive	issues’–	one	of	the	original	benefits	of
having	an	NSC.	Under	Theresa	May,	the	number	of	NSC	sub-committees	was	also	reduced	–	sources	indicated
that	some	of	these	hardly	ever	met	at	all.
The	political	instability	in	this	period	of	time,	due	to	the	lack	of	a	parliamentary	majority,	battles	over	Brexit,	and
rising	ministerial	leaks,	was	part	and	parcel	of	a		breakdown	of	trust	which	coincided	with	the	devaluation	of	the
NSC	under	May.	Some	sources	indicated	that	May	really	valued	the	NSC,	but	even	if	it	was	a	consequence	of
circumstance	and	external	pressure,	Theresa	May	oversaw	a	notable	decline	in	the	NSC.
New	National	Security	Adviser:	a	frosty	reception
The	biggest	announced	change	to	the	NSC	is	the	appointment	of	David	Frost	as	NSA.	A	former	diplomat,	Scotch
Whisky	Association	CEO,	and	SpAD	to	Boris	Johnson,	David	Frost	is	well-respected.	Yet	there	has	been
widespread	concern	about	his	appointment	to	the	role	of	NSA,	due	to	both	the	lack	of	relevant	security	experience
and	the	lack	of	accountability	following	the	decision	to	make	his	appointment	a	political	one,	breaking	from	previous
tradition.	Frost	will	also	hold	the	role	of	chief	Brexit	negotiator	when	he	starts	as	NSA	which	is	a	concern	for	some,
even	though	the	overlap	with	the	two	roles	is	currently	expected	to	be	of	short	duration.
It	makes	sense	to	look	to	America’s	NSC;	after	all,	our	model	is	based	on	theirs.	But	we	should	avoid	copying	their
mistakes:	in	defending	the	decision	to	make	the	NSA	a	political	appointee,	the	government	argued	that	this	was	not
unusual	in	America.	However,	Javed	Ali,	a	former	Senior	Director	of	Counterrorism	at	the	American	NSC,	told	us
how	having	a	political	appointee	as	NSA	was	controversial	in	the	US	too,	stating	that	‘there	has	been	lots	of	debate
in	Congress	in	changing	the	law	about	the	Nat	Sec	Advisor	position	to	allow	the	Senate	to	exercise	its	advice	and
consent	role,	similar	to	the	confirmation	process	for	other	equivalent	positions’.	There	are	also	concerns	in	the	US
about	the	NSA	holding	a	second	position.	Ali	told	us	that	‘there	is	some	thought	too	that	active	duty	military	officers
should	retire	if	so	appointed	(like	McMaster)	in	order	to	not	conflict	with	the	unique	requirements	of	the	job’.
Other	potential	NSC	reform
The	possibilities	for	reform	extend	beyond	just	the	NSA.	For	example,	the	argument	of	needing	to	balance	the
members	who	attend	the	NSC	is	a	well-trodden	one.	In	light	of	the	DfID/FCO	merger,	several	former	members	of
the	NSC	spoke	to	us	about	the	importance	of	keeping	a	unique	voice	for	Development	on	the	table,	to	avoid	the
risk	of	this	being	absorbed	by	the	FCO.	This	contrasts	with	the	view	shared	with	us	by	Tom	Swarbrick,	a	former
adviser	to	Theresa	May,	who	argues	that	there	is	a	need	to	reduce	the	number	of	people	who	attend	NSC
meetings.	Members	of	the	NSC	have	previously	expressed	to	him	that	membership	size	creates	logistical	issues
including	there	not	being	enough	time	for	everyone	to	make	their	points	and	then	substantially	discuss	the	issues	at
hand.
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There	is	also	a	need	to	have	a	membership	of	the	NSC	that	reflects	the	immediate	threats	facing	the	UK.	The	2015
NSS	and	SDSR	identified	pandemics	as	a	top	threat	for	the	UK	yet	the	Health	Secretary	was	not	a	permanent
member.	The	fact	that	this	was	still	the	case	when	the	latest	list	of	members	was	published	in	late	June,	in	the
middle	of	a	huge	crisis	sparked	by	the	coronavirus	pandemic,	remains	baffling.
One	of	the	challenges	of	the	national	security	and	foreign	policy	process	is	finding	the	balance	between	crisis
management	and	strategic	thinking.	An	aspect	of	the	NSC	infrastructure	that	is	crucial	in	obtaining	this	balance	is
the	‘NSC	Officials	Group’,	with	permenent-secretary-level	attendees	and	focussed	more	on	long-term	strategic
thinking.	As	Johnson	looks	to	reform	the	national	security	apparatus,	it	is	key	that	this	group	is	maintained	and
continues	to	meet,	even	when	the	main	NSC	isn’t	able	to.	Again	we	can	turn	to	our	US	counterparts	to	see	the
value	they	place	on	having	an	equivalent	system	at	the	NSC.	Javed	Ali	talked	about	the	importance	of	having	‘a
built-in	layer	of	integration	and	transparency	that	informs	the	highest	level	of	decision	making‘,	and	that	without	that
‘revert	to	a	decentralised	approach,	which	leads	to	bad	policy	outcomes	with	unintended	consequences’.	Bolstering
the	NSC	in	this	manner	does	carry	some	risks.	Sir	Christopher	Meyer,	former	UK	Ambassador	to	the	US,	told	us
the	UK	does	not	need/want	‘American	bureaucratic	gigantism’	in	its	national	security	process.
The	Merger	of	DfID	into	the	FCO
The	merger	was	unsurprisingly	unpopular	in	the	international	development	sector,	but	many	of	the	former	foreign
policy	advisers	we	spoke	with	reserved	judgment,	arguing	that	in	theory	the	move	could	be	successful.	There	has
been	a	need	for	several	years	now	to	better	co-ordinate	foreign	policy	in	Whitehall,	especially	around	having	a
shared	strategic	vision.	This	has	been	paired	with	growing	concerns	that	an	under-funded	and	under-staffed
Foreign	Office	has	fallen	into	neglect.	Former	Foreign	Secretary,	Lord	David	Owen,	in	particular	believes	that	the
merger	fits	with	the	radical	need	to	reduce	the	number	of	separate	ministries	and	number	of	ministers	who	attend
Cabinet	for	it	to	become	an	effective	decisionmaking	body	again.
There	are	of	course	risks	that	could	stem	from	the	DfID/FCO	merger,	including	the	fact	that	it	could	serve	as	the
starting	point	to	more	fundamental	changes	to	how	the	UK	does	international	aid.	These	range	from	moving	away
from	the	transparency	and	accountability	of	Official	Development	Assistance	spending	that	the	UK	had	in	DfID,	to
bigger	moves	such	as	moving	away	from	the	OECD	definition	of	Official	Development	Assistance,	or	even
eventually	scrapping	the	0.7%	gross	national	income	spending	on	it.
The	Integrated	Review
In	2020,	Johnson	announced	the	Integrated	Review,	the	newest	version	of	what	was	the	NSS,	but	which	brings
foreign	policy	and	international	development	very	explicitly	into	the	fold.	One	of	its	four	remits	is	to	‘identify	the
necessary	reforms	to	Government	systems	and	structures	to	achieve	these	goals’.	Although	the	Integrated	Review
has	been	delayed,	the	reforms	clearly	haven’t.	If	the	reforms	precede	the	review,	what	remains	the	purpose	of	the
latter?	Tobias	Ellwood	recently	echoed	that	we	are:	‘seeing	changes	in	Whitehall	architecture	without	firstly
understanding	threats	coming	over	the	horizon,	taking	a	stock	check	of	our	current	capabilities	and	then	working
out	what	we	actually	want’.
For	Lyall	Grant,	the	biggest	strategic	security	threat	the	UK	faces	remains	the	threat	to	the	rules-based	international
order.	To	combat	that	threat,	in	particular	from	China,	Lord	David	Owen	said	the	UK	must	focus	on	by	strengthening
defence	spending	within	NATO,	forging	a	unified	stance	within	the	Five	Eyes	rejecting	Huawei	5G,	and	working	with
partners	towards	a	new	policy	of	containment	to	deal	with	the	CCP’s	expansionist	ambitions	and	in	response	to
dismantling	of	One	Country,	Two	Systems	in	Hong	Kong.
The	UK	also	needs	to	assess	its	capabilities	across	defence,	soft	power,	aid,	diplomacy,	and	more.	For	Sir	David
Manning,	the	review	must	consider	not	only	the	post-Brexit	world	but	the	potential	for	a	‘post-special	relationship’
one	that	may	be	under	great	strain	if	Trump	is	re-elected.	He	cautions	that	‘if	Global	Britain	is	to	mean	anything	we
need	to	invest	in	our	defence	and	intelligence	capabilities	and	above	all	in	reinforcing	the	Foreign	Office	and	our
diplomatic	network	overseas’.
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All	of	this	leads	to	the	hope	that	the	Integrated	Review	can	help	the	UK	decide	on	what	it	wants	its	role	in	the	world
to	be.	Sir	Stephen	Wall,	the	former	Ambassador	to	the	EU	and	private	secretary	to	John	Major	believes	the
‘integrated	review	should	take	an	objective,	rigorous,	fact-based	approach	to	the	UK’s	place	in	the	world	post-
Brexit’.	Lyall	Grant	told	us	that	it	is	likely	the	UK	will	make	‘the	strategic	choice	to	remain	a	global	player	with	strong
regional	interests’	and	that	the	review	should	go	‘much	wider	than	machinery	of	government	and	focus	on	building
on	the	strategic	direction	taken	in	2015’.	In	order	to	do	so,	Sir	Stephen	Wall	argues	the	UK	must	‘make	ourselves
an	unavoidable	partner	both	for	the	US	and	our	erstwhile	fellow	EU	member	states’,	even	if	‘it	will	be	impossible	to
replicate	the	unique	cooperation	the	EU	provides’.
Whilst	it	is	unfortunate	that	this	government	has	decided	to	implement	structural	reform	before	reviewing	its
objectives	and	capabilities,	its	success	will	ultimately	depend	on	the	degree	of	clarity	it	brings	to	the	objectives	of
‘Global	Britain’,	and	whether	it	can	show	a	detailed	pathway	of	how	the	UK	can	get	to	where	it	wants	to	be.
Conclusion
After	one	year	as	Prime	Minister,	Boris	Johnson	has	stuck	with	his	ambition	for	a	‘Global	Britain’	and	not	been	shy
to	make	major	changes	in	that	pursuit.	It	has	been	clear	for	a	while	that	the	UK’s	security	and	foreign	policy	has
been	in	need	of	a	shake-up.	Yet	there	is	a	real	risk	that	the	shake-up	currently	being	orchestrated	by	Number	10
will	not	provide	the	solutions	the	UK	needs.	Recent	changes	already	indicate	that	the	UK’s	national	security
decisionmaking	process	is	set	to	further	radically	shift	under	Johnson’s	tenure	–	there	even	still	remains	a	small
possibility	that	the	NSC	in	its	current	format	will	be	scrapped	altogether.	This	would	be	a	mistake	as	it	continues	to
have	immense	value	as	a	vehicle	for	coordinating	policy.
The	UK	has	a	unique	opportunity	to	provide	strategic	clarity,	appropriate	funding,	and	structural	soundness	to	its
foreign	policy	and	national	security,	and	the	fact	the	government	has	already	shown	it	is	willing	to	take	action	is	a
positive	sign.	However,	as	it	does	so,	the	UK	risks	veering	towards	the	tendency	of	many	of	Johnson’s
predecessors:	to	centralise	power	in	an	unaccountable	nucleus	at	the	expense	of	a	collaborative	model	designed	to
encourage	long-term	strategic	thinking.
___________________
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